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Introduction
BRUCE H. MANN
The articles in this issue are drawn from the papers delivered at the confer-
ence “Ab Initio: Law in Early America,” held in Philadelphia on June
16–17, 2010—the ﬁrst conference in nearly ﬁfteen years to focus on law
in early America. It was sponsored by the Penn Legal History
Consortium, the McNeil Center for Early American Studies, the
American Society for Legal History, the University of Michigan Law
School, and the University of Minnesota Law School, under the direction
of Sarah Barringer Gordon, Martha S. Jones, William J. Novak, Daniel
K. Richter, Richard J. Ross, and Barbara Y. Welke. For two days,
ﬁfteen mostly younger scholars presented their research to a packed
house, with formal comments by senior scholars and vigorous discussion
with the audience. That earlier conference, “The Many Legalities of
Early America,” which convened in Williamsburg in 1996, had illustrated
the shift from what was once trumpeted as the “new” legal history to some-
thing that never acquired a name, perhaps because it was less self-
conscious in its methodology. “Ab Initio” offered the opportunity to ask
how the ﬁeld has changed in the years since.
The “new” legal history, which ﬂourished in the decades surrounding
the 1970s, was a socio-legal history that treated law as one social insti-
tution among many and sought to explain legal change in terms of social
and economic change. For a variety of reasons, and with only occasional
exceptions, early socio-legal historians rarely looked beyond economic
issues to questions of social structure, community, or religion. Their prin-
cipal focus was the economy, which had the effect of reducing the larger
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which the articles published were presented.ﬁeld of law and society to a subset, law and economy. For the nineteenth
century, attempts to prove or disprove the “Horwitz thesis” reinforced this
focus, a testament to how thoroughly Morton J. Horwitz’s exceptionally
incisive and provocative questions about the relationship between law
and economy transformed the ﬁeld. The “new” legal historians of early
America, on the other hand, took a somewhat broader approach. Coming
of age when early Americanists were on the cutting edge of social history,
they imbibed the social historian’s impulse to study society from the bot-
tom up and the social historian’s method of immersing oneself in large
quantities of diverse sources to discern meaning from patterns rather
than from individual instances. As social historians of law, they studied
how law looked to people who were not themselves lawyers or judges.
By the time of the “Many Legalities” conference, the intellectual focus
of early American legal history had shifted. Whereas the “new” legal his-
torians had seen the challenge of doing legal-history-as-social history as
how to connect the intricacies of legal substance and procedure to economy
and society, their successors were less centrally engaged with law. The
inner workings of practice and procedure, the interplay between internal
and external pressures for legal change or stability, the continuities and dis-
continuities between changes in law and in society, played fainter roles in
their inquiries. Instead, they tended to take law as a given–less an object of
study than a tool to study questions of gender, ethnicity, family, patriarchy,
culture, dependence, and the like. This is not to say that they were not
doing legal history or that they were not extending our knowledge of
law and society; far from it. Rather, what was often missing was an
equal marriage of legal and historical sophistication–a recognition that
attention to seemingly mundane matters of legal procedure and sensitivity
to the complexities of gender, race, culture, class, and the like, can comp-
lement one another. There were, of course, powerful exceptions–the work
of Cornelia Hughes Dayton and Holly Brewer come ﬁrst to mind–but for
the most part our understanding of early American law was not deepening
apace with our understanding of early American society.
In one sense, this changed focus could be said to have fulﬁlled the desire
of the “new” legal historians to treat law as so deeply embedded in the
world that one can look anywhere and see its reﬂection. But it left some-
thing out. Law is unquestionably a social phenomenon, but it retains
enough autonomy to be an actor in its own right. This was one of
Christopher Tomlins’ points in his introduction to the volume that came
out of the “Many Legalities” conference, in which he argued that law
was not just a framework, but a central actor in the extended processes
of colonization–an argument he has ﬂeshed out brilliantly in his recent
Bancroft Prize-winning book.
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reengagement with things legal. This may reﬂect the rising popularity of
joint J.D./Ph.D. degree programs, although they tend to attract people
more interested in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries than in the seven-
teenth or eighteenth. Another inﬂuence is undoubtedly William E. Nelson,
whose Legal History Colloquium and Golieb Fellowship Program at
New York University have been almost mandatory for young legal histor-
ians. In addition, some of the papers for the Ab Initio conference reﬂected
an interest in public law that was simply not there earlier.
Looking back over the last decade and a half, it is clear that the scholarly
migration forward in time that was already well under way has continued,
much as it has for the ﬁeld of early American history generally. The seven-
teenth century has largely disappeared as a period of study for legal histor-
ians. In fact, for most of the papers at the conference–apart from the articles
by Terri Snyder and Honor Sachs published here and one or two others–the
Revolution itself is receding in the rear-view mirror. The pages of the
William and Mary Quarterly reveal much the same trend for early
American history generally, albeit not quite as pronounced. The two
major institutional players in early American studies, the Omohundro
Institute for Early American History and Culture and the McNeil Center,
have both extended their purviews deeper into the nineteenth century. In
part, this is a natural consequence of two seemingly inconsistent, yet not
quite contradictory, changes in how we view the American Revolution.
The old view was that the Revolution marked a break with the past so
decisive that everything was transformed–so much so that if one was an
early Americanist, one’s courses and scholarship stopped no later than
1776, and the next shift did not take over until 1787, with a course on the
Revolution and Confederation sandwiched in between. To be sure, the
American Antiquarian Society, Charles Evans’s Early American Imprints,
and the Omohundro Institute (back when it was just the Institute), all main-
tained that everything up to 1815 or 1820 was fair game, but few scholars
went along. A newer view does not deny the revolutionary nature of the
Revolution, but it is more inclined to see the Revolution as accelerating
changes that were already underway rather than wiping the slate clean. In
terms of law, this meant that changes previously attributed to the
Revolution were now seen to have occurred or at least begun much earlier.
Large swaths of the legal history of the eighteenth century thus became part
of an interpretive arc that continued long after the Revolution. Ironically, this
may have helped isolate the legal history of the seventeenth century by
detaching it from that of the eighteenth century.
The second change in how we view the Revolution has been to make it
even bigger and more transformative; to say that its inﬂuence, not simply
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as it were, on the traditional portrayal of the decisiveness of the Revolution.
In this interpretation, the Revolution does not so much echo through the
decades as it rings loudly and reverberantly, almost forcing successive gen-
erations to measure themselves against the founding one.
The ﬁrst change is, in part, one of periodization. It is, of course, a truism
that temporal and physical divisions are human constructs and that what
historians see changes dramatically when they shift or expand their ﬁeld
of view. We saw this happen geographically when Britain’s Canadian
and Caribbean colonies were put back into the picture by expanding the
thirteen colonies that became the United States into the larger entity of
British North America. We saw it happen again with the historiographic
invention of “the Atlantic world.” And it is happening yet again with the
addition of the Asian Paciﬁc rim and India. Some of the best recent
work in early American legal history builds on this kind of expanded per-
spective, such as Lauren Benton’s work and Tomlins’, which are about so
much more than just early America.
These scholars aside, for legal historians the most productive change in
perspective has been temporal. In the new periodization, there is much
more continuity between the eighteenth century and the nineteenth. Law
in the middle of the eighteenth century was very different from what it
had been a century earlier and not as different from what it would be a cen-
tury later. For all its importance in other matters, and for all that law was
part of it, the Revolution was not a revolution in law, with the possible
exceptions of the law of slavery and some minor changes in rules of inheri-
tance. It may have accelerated certain legal changes by removing the con-
straint of empire, but the process of change was already well under way.
Simply revising the periodization of American legal history, without
more, is, of course, a bit of a parlor trick. Admittedly, the urge to stop
there is great. After all, legal historians once dismissed law in early
America as either British or as not law at all. Grant Gilmore dismissed
the colonial period in his 1974 Storrs Lectures with a short wave of his
hand as of “no more relevance than the law of the Sioux or the
Cheyennes.” Even the great Willard Hurst, a genuinely kind and gentle
man, would try to persuade every young legal historian he met that work-
ing in the colonial period was a misuse of scarce intellectual resources. So
there is a sense in which reperiodization is a form of revenge, if not out-
right patricide.
The real question about periodization is the “So what?” question Bernard
Bailyn would put to his graduate students after their seminar presentations.
The reminder that however curious or entertaining the objects of study are,
they must also be illuminating; they must cast light on the larger questions
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legal history–about detaching the eighteenth century from the seventeenth
and connecting it to the nineteenth–is whether it will make any difference
in how historians write about the eighteenth century generally, or is it
simply a variation on the time-honored game of trying to pinpoint the
decline of community in early New England?
What, then, is the “beginning” to which the “from the beginning” of
ab initio refers? The best answer may be that, as with many legalities,
there can be many beginnings, which vary according to one’s ﬁeld of
view. But if scholars of early American legal history are moving forward
into the nineteenth century, and if the Revolution is receding in the rear-
view mirror, we should not be tempted to rip out the mirror and say,
with a ﬂourish, that what is behind us does not matter.
The articles published here attest to the robust diversity of scholarship in
the ever-changing ﬁeld of early American legal history. Terri Snyder offers
a new perspective on families under slavery by examining how free women
of color married to enslaved men resorted to law in their efforts to protect
themselves and their children from exploitation and enslavement. Honor
Sachs similarly explores the shifting boundaries of slavery and freedom,
as multiple generations of an Afro-Indian family asserted their freedom
in the face of a tightening legal nexus between race and enslavement.
Alison LaCroix draws on her deep knowledge of federalism to argue
that extending general federal-question jurisdiction to the inferior federal
courts was a key element of the Federalists’–and, in particular, John
Marshall’s–project of building national supremacy into the structure of
the new republic. And Kevin Arlyck shows us how Spanish and
Portuguese consuls cannily, and largely successfully, turned to federal
courts to protect the commercial claims of their clients and, in effect, to
shape foreign relations, when the federal government itself failed or
refused to do so. Together, these articles offer a ﬁne snapshot of where
the ﬁeld is now.
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